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Abstract
Economic growth crucially depends on the level of R&D investment, as well as on
the existing labour market institutions (LMI); the latter might shape the amount of
profit obtained by each firm and its incentives to continuously innovate. This paper
proposes a novel analysis combining a Schumpeterian growth model with cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraints on R&D to study the impact of trade unions on economic
growth and social welfare. Two main results arise: one the one hand, economic
growth is always decreasing in trade union’s markup and interest rate. However, in
terms of social welfare, although Friedman rule appears to be optimal across all the
considered scenarios, free labour market can be suboptimal below a specific threshold
level of economic growth, depending on whether there is over or underinvestment
in R&D. Hence, by demanding a wage above the perfect competition equilibrium,
trade unions can have a positive impact on welfare through a reallocation of labour
among sectors. This relationship seems to be stronger for countries with lower labour
share and higher rents in the intermediate sector. This latter case highlights the
redistributive effect of trade unions, contributing for a decrease in inequality between
monopolists and workers. Therefore, for the case of the Eurozone, a “common” labour
market setting might be more “inefficient” than a common monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
The essential role of trade unions on society is widely recognised and has often been
a prominent issue in policy debates.1 From a macroeconomic viewpoint, however, their
effect may not be so clear; as indicated in Figure 1 (a), there seems to be no clear
relationship or a slightly negative one between a country’s labour union density and its
macroeconomic growth rate. This is not obviously consistent with another fact given in
Figure 1 (d) that a higher trade union density appears to be associated with more patent
applications, which should positively affect growth provided that the economy grows with
inventions resulting from research and development (R&D) activities.2 In addition, Figure
1 (b) shows that a higher trade union density relates to a higher employment rate. This
itself is natural, but there may still remain a mystery because the high employment rate
typically contributes to economic growth. All in all, data may only provide a mixed view
on the macroeconomic consequences of trade unions.
In line with this casual observation, the theory also seems controversial. Although
relatively less attention has been paid to the issue on trade unions and growth (Neto and
Silva, 2013), the results obtained so far can basically be split into two separate ways. For
example, Chang and Hung (2016) and Palokangas (2004) find that unions can contribute
positively to economic growth, whereas Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013) and Barbosa and
Faria (2011) argue that unions have a negative effect on growth.3
Hence, what are the effects of unions on employment, R&D, and growth? All the above
provide us with the motivation to conduct a deeper study on this question. In dealing
with R&D in a growth-theoretic environment, we explicitly incorporate an empirically
supported idea that investing in R&D crucially depends on the nominal interest rate, for
instance, through cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints (Chu and Lai, 2013; Aghion et al.,
2012; Brown et al., 2012; and Chu, 2010). In modeling unions and employment, we
naturally go with a standard method based on wages and unit labour costs (e.g., Neto
et al., 2017; Chang and Hung, 2016; and Chu et al., 2016).
Therefore, we propose a novel analysis combining a Schumpeterian growth model
with CIA constraints on R&D, and trade unions. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study to combine these three features into a single, integrated, endogenous
growth model. Besides answering our main research question, this framework also allows
to study: (a) the optimality of Friedman rule; (b) the existence of an optimal trade
union’s markup. Regarding the literature, we rely on Chu and Cozzi (2014) to build our
theoretical framework.
1For example, some recent Reuter News articles argue that “[t]he German government and unions
have agreed on a two-stage wage increase of 4.75 percent over this year and next for more than 2
million public sector employees at the federal and municipal level” (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
germany-strike-idUSKCN0XQ14E); “[F]rench students and trade unions staged protest marches across
the country (...) against far-reaching labor reforms” (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-protests-
idUSKCN0WB0GW); and “US unions plan attack on Donald Trump in attempt to derail presidential bid”
(http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/26/us-unions-donald-trump-us-election-2016). Hence,
they can bargain wages, promote labour reforms, and even influence the political agenda.
2Endogenous growth theory identifies inventions coming out from R&D investments as a main source
of long-run growth; see, for example, Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and
Howitt (1992).
3A recent study by Chu et al. (2016) demonstrates a more moderate result that depending on whether
the trade union is wage (employment)-oriented, they can have a negative (positive) effect on economic
growth.
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Figure 1: The relationship between Trade Union Density and Main Economic Variables
Source: OECD on-line database, tables: (1) Short-Term Labour Market Statistics - Employment rates
and Trade union density; (2) R and D personnel total, as percentage of employment; (3) PCT patents ap-
plications per 10.000 inhabitants; (4) Long-term interest rate, available at http://stats.oecd.org (accessed
on May 2016). Notes: Annual data (2002-2014), 29 OECD countries, Pooled OLS, N=377.
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However, despite the richness of their framework, introducing labour market imperfec-
tions in the final-good sector (i.e., a trade union) allows us to complement their analysis
and to further study the impact of trade unions on economic growth and welfare, as well
as the relationship between monetary policy and different types of wage-setting frame-
work. Additionally, this paper also relates with Chang and Hung (2016) and Chu et al.
(2016). Nevertheless, the role of CIA and its impact on R&D, combined with a different
wage setting approach, are some of the features that are present in our approach and help
to complement and enhance the analysis of the previous papers.
Our main conclusions can be summarised as follows. First, economic growth is de-
creasing in both interest rate and trade union’s markup; nevertheless, regarding welfare,
although Friedman rule seems to be optimal for all the considered cases, a competitive
labour market framework can be suboptimal below a specific threshold level of economic
growth, depending on whether there is over or underinvestment of R&D; hence, by de-
manding a wage above the perfect competition equilibrium, trade unions can have a
positive impact on welfare through a reallocation of labour among sectors; second, this
relationship seems to be stronger for countries with lower labour share and higher rents
in the intermediate sector. This latter case highlights the redistributive effect of trade
unions, contributing for a decrease in inequality between monopolists and workers. Third,
there seems to exist an interdependency between monetary policy and the macroeconomic
role of trade unions: a lower (higher) interest rate increases (decreases) the effectiveness
of trade union’s markup on R&D labour and social welfare. Finally, these results have
strong policy implications concerning monetary policy and labour market frameworks. If
Friedman rule seems to be suitable for a wide range of parameters (i.e., different type
of countries), this is certainly not the case for the labour market framework. Hence, for
the case of the Eurozone, a “common” labour market setting might be more “inefficient”
than a common monetary policy. A correct work of trade unions through determination
of wages (i.e., the markup’s size) might be the answer to promote economic growth and
innovation.
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces a general description
of the model. Section 3 describes the equilibrium and its main properties. Section 4
analyses the optimal trade union’s markup, and Section 5 studies the optimal monetary
policy. Section 6 provides a quantitative exercise. Finally, Section 7 states the main
conclusions.
2 AMonetary Schumpeterian GrowthModel with Trade
Unions
2.1 Final good sector
Final good for consumption is homogenous and is produced by competitive firms that
combine labour and intermediate goods, as follows:
yt =
1
1− β
(ˆ 1
0
xt (j)
1−β dj
)
Lβy,t, (1)
where xt (j) denotes the quantitive of intermediate goods j [0, 1] and Ly corresponds to
the labour used in final goods production. From profit maximisation, the demand function
for xt (j) and Ly,t are, respectively,
4
xt (j) =
Ly,t
p
1/β
x,t (j)
, (2)
LDy,t = w
− 1
1−β
t
[
β
1− β
(ˆ 1
0
xt (j) dj
)]
, (3)
where px,t (j) is the price of xt (j), and wt is the wage.
2.2 Labour market framework: Monopoly trade union
As one of the main novelties of this paper, we embed an imperfect competitive labour
market into an endogenous growth model. Imperfect competition is modeled through
including a monopoly trade union, firstly proposed by Dunlop (1944) and Ross (1948).4
Within this framework, the union decides unilaterally the level of wages, leaving firms to
choose the level of employment afterwards. The monopoly trade union operates exclu-
sively in the final-good sector and its utility function is assumed to have the following
Stone-Geary form:
UMU = (wt − w¯t)1−v
(
LDy,t
)v
, (4)
where wt corresponds to the demanded wage and w¯t to the perfect competition wage.
The value of v states whether the union is relatively more employment-oriented or more
wage-oriented. Since wages are set by the union previously to the firm’s decision on the
employment level, it can anticipate the impact of their wage claims on the employment
level. Replacing (3) into (4), and maximising UMU in order to wt, we have:
wt = φw¯t, (5)
where φ = 1(
1− 1−v
v
1
εL,w
) > 1 can be interpreted as a markup over the perfect competition
wage, and εL,w is the elasticity of labour demand. We believe this markup can be a proxy
of the trade union density discussed in Sector 1, in a sense that countries with high trade
union density would present a higher markup due to higher bargaining power. Although
set in the final good sector, wages apply to workers in the other productive sectors.
2.3 Intermediate-good sector
There is a unit-continuum of industries producing j-different quality-enhancing inter-
mediate goods. Each industry is dominated by a temporary industry leader until the
arrival of the next innovation, and the owner of the new innovation becomes the next
industry leader. This dynamics captures the so called Arrow replacement effect.5 The
production function for the leader in industry j is:
xt (j) = z
qt(j)Lx,t(j), (6)
4For a survey regarding the labour market framework see, among others, Lawson (2011) and Kaufman
(2002).
5See Cozzi (2007) for a survey.
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where the parameter z > 1 is the step-size of a productivity improvement, and qt (j) is
the number of productivity improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time
t. Lx,t(j) is the production labour in industry j. Following Chu and Cozzi (2014), we
adopt a cost-reducing view of vertical innovation as in Peretto (1998). This implies that,
given zqt(j), the (perfect competitive) marginal cost of production for the industry leader
in industry j is mct (j) = w¯tzq(j) , and the amount of monopolistic profit is given by:
Πt (j) = px,t (j)xt (j)− φw¯tLx,t (j) . (7)
We explicitly separate the union’s markup and the perfect competitive marginal cost to
better study the relationship between trade unions and profits. The standard Bertrand
price competition leads to a profit-maximizing price px,t (j) determined by a markup
µ = px,t(j)
mct(j)
over the perfect competitive marginal cost. As in Grossman and Helpman
(1991), the markup is assumed to equal the step size z of innovation.
Following Acemoglu (2009), we normalise the prices to unity, i.e., px,t (j) = 1. Hence,
recalling (2), we get:
Πt =
(µ− φ)
µ
Ly,t. (8)
Finally, production-labour income is given by: wtLx,t (j) = φµLy,t. Since wt corresponds
to the monopoly wage, through using (5), we get:
w¯tLx,t (j) =
1
µ
Ly,t. (9)
2.4 R&D-good sector
Denote vt (j) as the value of the monopolistic firm in industry j. From (8), we know
that pit (j) = pit, j [0, 1]. Combining this fact with the symmetry of the profit-sharing
rule across industries implies that vt (j) = vt, j [0, 1]. In other words, the arrival rate of
innovation across industries is the same. Hence, the standard no-arbitrage condition for
vt is given by
rtvt = Πt + v˙t − λtvt. (10)
The left-hand side is the risk-free return of holding vt as an asset. The right-hand side
represents the expected asset return, which corresponds to the sum of (a) the monopolistic
profit pit, (b) potential capital gains v˙t, and (c) expected per capita loss, λtvt, due to
creative destruction; λt stands for the arrival rate of the next innovation.
There is a unit continuum of R&D firms indexed by k [0, 1], hiring R&D-labour,
Lr,t (k), for innovation. The labour cost for R&D is wtLr,t (k). Following Chu and Cozzi
(2014), we assume that the entrepreneur faces a CIA constraint and needs to borrow a spe-
cific amount of money from households, Bt (k), subject to the nominal interest rate, i. For
simplicity, we also assume that Bt (k) = wtLr,t(k), which implies that firms need to bor-
row the entire wage bill, and the total cost of R&D per unit of time is (1 + it)φw¯tLr,t (k).6
Note that the trade union’s markup and the CIA constraint on R&D gives the trade union
and the monetary authority the ability to influence and affect the equilibrium allocation
6For a detailed explanation, see Chu and Cozzi (2014).
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of resources across sectors through the markup and the nominal interest rate, respectively.
The zero-expected-profit condition of firm k is given by:
vtλt (k) = (1 + it)φw¯tLr,t (k) , (11)
where λt (k) = ϕ¯Lr,t (k) corresponds to the firm-level innovation arrival rate per unit
time. ϕ¯ = ϕ
Nt
captures the dilution effect that removes scale effects (Laincz and Peretto,
2006), where ϕ is the R&D productivity parameter. Therefore, the aggregate arrival rate
of innovation is:
λt =
ˆ 1
0
λt (k) dk =
ϕ
Nt
Lr,t = ϕlr,t,
where lr,t =
Lr,t
Nt
represents the intensity of R&D (measured as R&D employment per
capita). Similarly, lx,t =
Lx,t
Nt
and ly,t =
Ly,t
Nt
stand for employment intensity (per capita)
in the intermediate and final-goods sectors, respectively.
2.5 Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a life time utility function
given by
U =
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt [ln ct + θ ln (1− lt)] dt, (12)
where ct is per capita consumption of final goods and lt is the supply of labour per
person at time t. The parameters θ ≥ 0 and ρ > 0 determine, respectively, the leisure
preferences and the subjective discount rate. At time t, the population size equals Nt,
and grows at an exogenous rate n ≥ 0.7 Each household maximises (12) subject to the
following asset-accumulation equation:
a˚t + m˚t = (rt − n) at + wtlt + τt − ct − (pit + n)mt + itbt. (13)
rt is the real interest rate and a˚t is the real value of assets owned by each household in the
form of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate goods firms. Each household supplies
labour lt (inelastically if θ = 0) to earn a real wage rate, wt, which is set by the trade
union. The cost of holding money is given by pit, the inflation rate, and τt is a a lump-sum
transfer that households take as given. mt is the per capita real money balance held to
enable lending to the R&D sector. The CIA constraint is given by bt ≤ mt, where bt is
the amount of money borrowed from each household by entrepreneurs to finance R&D
investment. The return on bt is it.
The optimality condition for consumption is:
1
ct
= ηt, (14)
where ηt is the Hamiltonian co-state variable. The optimality condition for labour supply
is:
7We assume that the utility function is based on per capita utility. Alternatively, one can assume that
the utility function is based on aggregate utility, in which case the effective discount rate simply becomes
ρ− n.
7
wt (1− lt) = θct, (15)
and the intertemporal optimality condition is given by:
− n˚t
ηt
= rt − ρ− n. (16)
Finally, from the dynamic optimisation, we also derive a no-arbitrage condition
it = rt + pit. (17)
2.6 Monetary authority
Mt denotes the nominal money supply. The aggregate real money balance is mtNt =
Mt
Pt
, where Pt denotes the price of final goods. The central bank is assumed to exogenously
set it and the inflation rate is endogenously determined accordingly to pit = it− rt. Then,
the growth rate of nominal money supply is also endogenously determined accordingly to
M˚t
Mt
= m˚t
mt
+ pit + n. Finally, the monetary authority returns the seigniorage revenue as a
lump transfer τtNt = M˚tPt = [m˚t + (pit + n)mt]Nt to households.
3 Closing the model
In this section we (a) define the decentralised equilibrium; (b) derive the balanced-
growth path; and (c) find the socially optimal allocation of resources.
3.1 Decentralised Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a path of allocations {ct,mt, lt,, yt, xt (j) , Ly,t, Lx,t (j) , Lr,t (k)} and
a path of prices {px,t (j) , wt, rt, it, vt}. Also, at each instance of time:
• households choose {at, ct} to maximise utility taking {it, rt, wt} as given;
• competitive final-goods firms produce {yt} and choose {Ly,t}to maximise profit tak-
ing {px,t (j) , wt} as given;
• trade union chooses {wt}to maximise utility taking
{
LDy,t
}
as given;
• monopolistic intermediate-goods firms produce {xt (j)} and choose {Lx,t (j) , px,t (j)}
to maximise profits according to the Bertrand price competition and taking {wt} as
given;
• R&D firms choose {Lr,t (k)} to maximise expected profit taking {it, wt, vt} as given;
• the market-clearing condition for labour holds such that Ly,t + Lx,t + Lr,t = ltNt;
• the market-clearing condition for final goods holds such that yt = ctNt;
• the value of monopolistic firms adds up to the value of households’ assets such that
vt = atNt;
• the amount of money borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs is wtLr,t = btNt.
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Balanced-growth path
Substituting (6) into (1), we find the aggregate production function
yt =
1
1− βZ
1−β
t L
1−β
x,t L
β
y,t, (18)
where aggregate technology Zt is defined as
Zt = exp
(ˆ 1
0
qt (j) dj ln z
)
. (19)
Applying the law of large numbers on the previous equation yields
Zt = exp
(ˆ 1
0
λsds ln z
)
. (20)
Finally, differentiating the log of (20) with respect to t gives the growth rate of aggregate
technology as:
gt ≡ Z˚t
Zt
= λt ln z = (ϕ ln z) lr,t. (21)
THEOREM 1. Given a constant nominal interest rate i and a markup over perfect
competitive wages, the economy immediately jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable
balanced growth path along which each variable grows at a constant (possible zero) rate.
PROOF. See Appendix I.

On the balanced growth path, the equilibrium labour allocation is stationary. Recalling
rt =
pit+v˙t−λtvt
vt
and r = g + ρ+ n, imposing balanced growth path on (10) gives vt = Πtρ+λ .
Therefore, combining the next four equations,
vt =
Πt
ρ+λ
vtλt (k) = (1 + it)φw¯tLr,t (k)
λt = ϕlr,t
Πx =
(µ−φ)
µ
Ly,t
,
we can derive the first of four equations needed to find the equilibrium labour allocation
across sectors.
(µ− φ) lx = (1 + i)φ
(
ρ
ϕ
+ lr
)
. (22)
Notice that, since we assume px,t = 1, we also know that y = 11−βLy. Recalling (9), we
get y = 1
1−β [w¯µLx]. Thus, combining:{
φw¯ (1− l) = θc
y = c = 1
1−β [w¯µlx]
,
we obtain the second equation:
9
l = 1− θ
φ
(
1
1− β
)
µlx. (23)
Moreover, we also know that the perfect competition wages corresponds to w¯ = β
1−β .
Combined this result with (9), we get the third equation:
β
1− β lx =
1
µ
ly. (24)
Finally, we just need to define the per capita version of the labour-market-clearing con-
dition:
l = ly + lx + lr. (25)
Combining the previous four equations, and after some mathematical manipulation, we
find:
lx =
(1− β) (1 + i)φ
µβ (1 + i)φ+ (1− β) (iφ+ µ) + θ (1 + i)µ
(
1 +
ρ
ϕ
)
. (26)
Obtaining the remaining employment levels across sectors is straightforward:
lr =
(µ− φ) (1− β)
µβ (1 + i)φ+ (1− β) (iφ+ µ) + θ (1 + i)µ
(
1 +
ρ
ϕ
)
− ρ
ϕ
, (27)
ly =
µβ (1 + i)φ
µβ (1 + i)φ+ (1− β) (iφ+ µ) + θ (1 + i)µ
(
1 +
ρ
ϕ
)
, (28)
l =
µβ (1 + i)φ+ (1− β) (iφ+ µ)
µβ (1 + i)φ+ (1− β) (iφ+ µ) + θ (1 + i)µ
(
1 +
ρ
ϕ
)
− ρ
ϕ
. (29)
Equations (26) and (28) show that the shares of intermediate-goods’ labour, lx, and final-
goods’ labour, ly, increase with trade union’s markup, φ, and with nominal interest rate,
i, under both elastic (θ > 0) and inelastic (θ = 0) labour supply.8 On the other hand, l is
increasing in φ but decreasing in i. Finally, (27) shows that R&D-labour, lr, is decreasing
in the trade union’s markup, φ, and in nominal interest rate, i, under both elastic and
inelastic labour supply.
PROPOSITION 1. Labour supply is increasing in trade union’s markup but decreasing
in interest rate, whereas R&D labour is decreasing in both variables. Furthermore, both
final-goods’ labour and intermediate-goods’ labour are increasing both in trade union’s
markup and interest rate.
PROOF. Proven in the text.

8Note that, under θ = 0, ly =
µβ(1+i)φ
µβ(1+i)φ+(1−β)(iφ+µ)
(
1 + ρϕ
)
, lx =
(1−β)(1+i)φ
µβ(1+i)φ+(1−β)(iφ+µ)
(
1 + ρϕ
)
,
lr =
(µ−φ)(1−β)
µβ(1+i)φ+(1−β)(iφ+µ)
(
1 + ρϕ
)
− ρϕ , and l = 1.
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Interestingly, by the definition of φ, a more employment-oriented union (a higher
v) means a lower markup φ. By Proposition 1, this implies that a more employment-
oriented union results in a smaller amount of the total labor supply, l, which seems rather
paradoxical but understandable within the model as follows. On the one hand, under
this framework, companies within the intermediate sector employ all workers willing to
provide labour due to the existing constant markup. In other words, firms will have a
“fixed” margin of revenues. On the other hand, taking into account the standard positive
effect of wages on labour supply, (15), a more wage-oriented union can increase the amount
of workers available in the market. Hence, combining this with the constant markup and
its inter-connection with the final sector, a more wage(employment)-oriented union results
in a larger(smaller)-amount of production labour, ly and lx, as well as in the total labour
supply, l. Concerning R&D labour, since a higher φ implies a higher innovation cost,
without a constant markup R&D firms will need to decrease their level of employment,
lr.
Furthermore, the previous results imply that economic growth given by g = (ϕ ln z) lr
also decreases with φ and i. Note that:
g = (ϕ ln z) lr =
[
(µ− φ) (1− β) (ϕ+ ρ)
µβ (1 + i)φ+ (1− β) (iφ+ µ) + θ (1 + i)µ − ρ
]
ln z. (30)
The negative effect of i on g is in line with the empirical evidence provided by Brown
et al. (2011) and Becker and Pain (2008), where a higher(lower) interest rate implies a
lower(higher) level of R&D expenditure due to the increase in investment costs. Chu
and Lai (2013) states a negative relationship between interest rate and R&D through
inflation. This effect is also present in our paper through (16) and (17). On the other
hand, Doucouliagos and Laroche (2013), Barbosa and Faria (2011) and Lingens (2009)
document a negative relationship between trade unions and economic growth, which is
in line with (30).9 Furthermore, both theoretical effects are in line with the empirical
motivation provided in Figure 1 (a,e).
PROPOSITION 2. Economic growth is decreasing in trade union’s markup and nom-
inal interest rate.
PROOF. Proven in the text.

An advantage of the model is that we have both money and unions in a single setup.
Hence, it is possible to study the interaction of i and θ by studying the sign of ∂
∂i
∣∣∣∂lr∂φ ∣∣∣. If
negative, the negative effect of φ on R&D lr (or the positive effect of a more employment-
oriented union on R&D) is magnified by a lower nominal interest rate, which highlights the
interdependency between monetary policy (based on a CIA constraint) and the macroe-
conomic role of trade unions. Through some mathematical manipulations, we get
∂2lr
∂i∂φ
≡ −µ (1− β) (1− β + βµ+ θ)
(ζi+ (ζ + (1− β)µ))3 [(1− β)µ− (1 + i) ζ − (2 + i) (1− β)φ] ,
9Nevertheless, according to Chu et al. (2016), Mukherjee and Wang (2013) and Menezes-Filho et al.
(1998), the effect of trade unions on economic growth might be positive if both trade unions and firms
bargaining over wages and employment, which is not the case in this paper.
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where ζ ≡ µ (βφ+ θ). This expression of ∂2lr
∂i∂φ
is strictly positive for any i ≥ 0 and
φ > 1 if 1 − 2β < θ, which holds for the range of empirically plausible parameters (see
Section 6).10 Since ∂2lr
∂i∂φ
> 0 means ∂
∂i
∣∣∣∂lr∂φ ∣∣∣ < 0 due to ∂lr∂φ < 0, the negative effect of
the union’s markup (the positive effect of an employment-oriented union) on R&D and
growth is magnified by a smaller nominal interest rate, i. Conversely, as i is higher, φ′s
negative effect on lr is smaller. This result crucially relates with our motivation - indeed,
under a low-interest scenario or an autonomous monetary policy, a correct work of trade
unions through determination of wages (i.e., the markup’s size) might be the answer to
promote economic growth and innovation.
PROPOSITION 3: There is an interdependency between monetary policy and the
macroeconomic role of trade unions: a lower (higher) interest rate increases (decreases)
the effectiveness of trade union’s markup on R&D labour and economic growth.
PROOF. Proven in the text.

3.2 Socially Optimal Allocation
Following Chu and Cozzi (2014), it is possible to derive the socially optimal allocation
of the model. Imposing balanced growth on (12), we get:
U =
1
ρ
[
ln (c0) +
g
ρ
+ θ ln (1− l)
]
, (31)
where c0 = Z1−β0 l1−βx lβy , g = λ ln z = (ϕ ln z) lr and the exogenous Z0 is normalized to
unity. Maximizing the previous equation subject to l = ly+ lx+ lr, we obtain the first-best
allocation, here denoted with a superscript *:
l∗y = β
ρ
ϕ ln (z)
, (32)
l∗x = (1− β)
ρ
ϕ ln (z)
, (33)
l∗r = 1−
ρ (1 + θ)
ϕ ln (z)
, (34)
l∗ = 1− ρθ
ϕ ln (z)
. (35)
As in Chu and Cozzi (2014), we restrict the parameter space to ensure that l∗r > 0, which,
in turn, implies that l∗ > 0.
10Since (1− β)µ−(1 + i) ζ−(2 + i) (1− β)φ ≡ Φ is decreasing in φ > 1 and i ≥ 0, we have sup(φ,i)Φ ≡
(1− 2β − θ)µ−2 (1− β), noting ζ ≡ µ (βφ+ θ). This supremum is always negative when 1−2β−θ < 0.
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4 Optimal Trade Union’s markup
Taking into account the social optimal allocation, in this section we provide a detailed
analysis regarding the optimal trade union’s markup, assuming an exogenous constant
interest rate. As we stated in Section 1, this corresponds to one of the main novelties of
our analysis since, to best of our knowledge, we are the first to assess the implications of
an optimal trade union’s markup within a quality-ladder R&D model.
We first analyse the case of inelastic labour supply (Section 4.1); then, we consider the
general case of elastic labour supply (Section 4.2). We denote φ∗ as the optimal union’s
markup, referring to the trade union’s markup that maximises social welfare, regardless of
whether or not it enables the first-best socially optimal allocations {ly, lx, lr, l}. It might
be the case that the optimal trade union’s markup fails to optimally allocate labour across
sectors. We will discuss this possibility under both scenarios.
4.1 Optimal trade union’s markup under inelastic labour supply
Under inelastic labour supply, by choosing the optimal trade union’s markup, φ∗ (from
∂U
∂φ
= 0), the first-best allocation {l∗Y , l∗x, l∗r} may be enabled as follows:
φ∗ =
 (1− β)µ
(1 + i) [(1− β) + βµ]
[
ln (z)
(
ϕ
ρ
+ 1
)
− 1
]
+ (1− β)
, 1
 . (36)
Since trade union’s markup cannot be lower than 1 (corresponding to the perfect compet-
itive wage), we impose φ∗ ≥ 1. Hence, if φ∗ = 1, a perfect competitive labour market is
optimal, but the first-best allocation may not be attained, unless φ∗ = 1 holds exactly and
it is not binding. On the other hand, if φ∗ > 1, a competitive labour market is inefficient
(in a sense that φ∗ = 1 does not correspond to the optimal markup) and the first-best
allocation is attained with φ = φ∗.
Moreover, it is important to note that, due to some specific characteristics of the
quality-ladder models, such as the intertemporal spillover effect and the business-stealing
effect (Chu and Cozzi, 2014), and the monopoly distortion effect (Denicolò and Zanchet-
tin, 2014; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), the equilibrium with φ = 1 may feature either
overinvestment or underinvestment in R&D. Over(Under)investment is associated with lr
versus l∗r . Indeed, comparing l∗r with lr under θ = 0, it is possible to prove that φ∗ > 1 if
and only if the decentralised equilibrium lr, evaluated at φ = 1, is greater than optimal
l∗r . Therefore, R&D overinvestment in equilibrium is a necessary and sufficient condition
for a competitive labour market to be suboptimal.
PROPOSITION 4. If and only if R&D overinvestment occurs under the competitive
labour market equilibrium, the optimal trade union’s markup would be strictly positive;
in this case, a competitive labour market is suboptimal. If and only if the optimal trade
union’s markup is positive, then φ∗ enables the first-best allocation
{
l∗y, l
∗
x, l
∗
r
}
.
PROOF. Impose θ = 0 on l∗r and compare it with lr.
lr|φ=1 > l∗r ⇔
(µ− 1) (1− β)
µβ (1 + i) + (1− β) (i+ µ)
(
1 +
ρ
ϕ
)
− ρ
ϕ
> 1− ρ
ϕln (z)
.
A few mathematical manipulations show that the previous equation is equivalent to:
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(1 + i) [(1− β) + βµ]
[
ln (z)
(
ϕ
ρ
+ 1
)
− 1
]
+ (1− β) < (1− β)µ,
Thus, lr|φ=1 > l∗r if and only if (1 + i) [(1− β) + βµ]
[
ln (z)
(
ϕ
ρ
+ 1
)
− 1
]
+ (1− β) <
(1− β)µ, which corresponds to the numerator in (36). Hence, lr|φ=1 > l∗r ⇔ φ∗ > 1.

Regarding the comparative statics of φ∗ when it is strictly positive, it is interesting to
note that φ∗ is decreasing with i∗, which is in line with the empirical motivation provided
in Figure 1,f). Intuitively, a larger interest rate decreases R&D through the increase
in R&D costs, which implies that R&D overinvestment (underinvestment) is less (more)
likely to occur.
On the other hand, φ∗ is increasing in µ, meaning that a larger markup in the interme-
diate sector (which can be interpreted as a larger patent breadth) increases R&D - in this
case, overinvestment is more likely to occur. Note that, from other point of view, a higher
markup in the intermediate sector also allows the trade union to demand a higher wage
for its workers. In this case, unions work to decrease inequality between monopolists and
workers. Furthermore, φ∗ is decreasing in β, the parameter that accounts for the labour-
intermediate goods ratio share in the final good sector. One possible interpretation relates
with the fact that when β increases, the labour share in the final-good sector increases
and the share of intermediate goods decreases, which negatively affects the amount of
labour available for the R&D sector, leading to a decrease in R&D activity - in this case,
underinvestment is now more likely to occur. Finally, φ∗ is increasing in ρ and decreasing
in ϕ, and z due to the over(under)investment mechanism.
4.2 Optimal trade unions’ markup under elastic labour supply
Taking into account (29), under elastic labour supply (θ > 0), labour supply l is
decreasing in φ. In this case, the trade union’s market power entails a distortionary effect
on the consumption-leisure decision, implying that the optimal trade union’s markup can
no longer achieve the first-best allocation. Since the optimal trade union’s markup rate
is given by ∂U
∂φ
= 0, after a few steps of mathematical manipulation, one can get:
φ∗ =
−
{
ΨΦ (1− θ)−Θ
(
ϕ
ρ
+ 1
)}
±
√{
ΨΦ (1− θ)−Θ
(
ϕ
ρ
+ 1
)}2
+ 4 (θΦ2) Ψ2
−2θΦ2 , 1
 ,
(37)
with Θ = (1− β)µ (1 + i) {θ + µβ + (1− β)} ln (z), Ψ = µ [θ (1 + i) + (1− β)], and Φ =
(1 + i)µβ + (1− β) i.
In this case, it might be possible that the optimal trade union’s markup include two
different solutions, conditional on φ∗ > 1. In Section 6.2, below, we numerically simulate
in detail its dynamics and the main implications of φ∗ under elastic labour supply.
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5 Optimal Monetary Policy and the Friedman Rule
This section closely follows Chu and Cozzi (2014) and could be considered as a general
case. Indeed, adding the assumption of a constant trade union’s markup, we take into
account the two possible scenarios of inelastic and elastic labour supply. Denoting i∗ as
the optimal interest rate, it might also be the case that the optimal interest rate fails to
optimally allocate labour across sectors. Following the same approach as in Section 4,
the optimal nominal interest rate under elastic and elastic labour supply are given by,
respectively,
i∗ = max
µ [(1− β) + βφ]− [µβ + (1− β)]φ
[
ln (z)
(
ϕ
ρ
+ 1
)]
[µβ + (1− β)]φ
[
ln (z)
(
ϕ
ρ
+ 1
)
− 1
] , 0
 (38)
and
i∗ =
(
µ−Θ
Θ − φ, 0
)
, (39)
where Θ is a composite parameter defined as:
Θ =
{
[µβφ+ (1− β)φ+ θµ]
(1 + θ) (1− β)
(
ϕ
ρ
+ 1
)
ln (z)
}
− µβφ+ θµ
(1− β) . (40)
As in Chu and Cozzi (2014), R&D overinvestment in equilibrium is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the Friedman rule to be suboptimal. Nevertheless, setting i∗ = i
under the elastic labour supply case does not yield the first-best allocation of manufac-
turing and labour supply, but yields the first-best allocations for R&D labour. Finally,
the relationship between i∗ and φ is identical to the one identified in the previous section
- i∗ is decreasing in φ if i∗ > 0.
6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we provide a numerical simulation on the optimality of the trade
union’s markup (Section 6.1) and the Friedman rule (Section 6.2), under both inelastic
and elastic labour supply. Under the former case, we have the following set of parameters
{ρ, z, µ, ϕ, β, iLR} ,where iLR corresponds to the long-run nominal interest rate, which is
set to 0.08 (Chu and Cozzi, 2014). Note that, for the analysis of the optimal monetary
rule, we also need to specific the (exogenous) value of φ. We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit
(2012) and Barlevy (2007) to set the discount rate ρ to 0.05 (meaning that a unit of time
in the model corresponds to a year) and the step size z of innovation to 1.05. Regarding
the markup, we set µ = 1.275, a slightly higher value than Chu and Cozzi (2014), but
within the empirical estimates reported by Jones and Williams (2000) and the calibrated
values in Reis and Sequeira (2007). In regards to β, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)
reports a global decline of the labor share mostly since the early 1980s. Hence, we consider
two scenarios: β = 0.3 and β = 0.6. These values aim to represent a lower and a higher
bound, respectively, and are in line with the empirical estimates reported in Samaniego
and Sun (2015) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), as well as with the calibrated
values in Barlevy (2007) and Reis and Sequeira (2007). Furthermore, by considering a
higher and a lower value for β, we can also take into account the reported estimates by
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OECD (2015) and Guerriero (2012), capturing that developing countries exhibit lower
labor shares than developed ones.
Following Chu and Cozzi (2014), we fix g = 0.02, which corresponds to the long-run
economic growth rate of the United States. However, we also take into consideration the
argument that long-run economic growth might not be entirely driven by domestic R&D
investment (Comin, 2004). According to Chu (2010), for the US economy, the fraction f
of long-run economic growth driven by domestic R&D investment is approximately 0.4.
Hence, we analyse the optimal interest rate and trade union’s markup for f [0.3, 1]. Since
considering lower values of f is equivalent to consider lower economic growth rates, we
can extend our analysis to other countries with different R&D growth patterns and lower
growth rates, respectively. Hence, the R&D productivity parameter (ϕ) is calibrated to
match the value of g = (ϕ ln z) lr, where lr depends on the elasticity of the labour supply.
In the analysis of optimal interest rate, φ is exogenous and set at unity ensuring a perfect
competitive labour market.
ρ z µ g iLR βLow βHigh φ θ
0.05a 1.05a 1.275b 0.02c 0.08c 0.30d 0.60d 1.00 2.30c
Table 1: Baseline calibration
a) Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) and Barlevy (2007).
b) Chu and Cozzi (2014), Reis and Sequeira (2007) and Jones and Williams (2000).
c) Chu and Cozzi (2014).
d) Samaniego and Sun (2015),Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), Barlevy (2007), Reis and Sequeira
(2007).
In the case of elastic labour supply, we have one extra parameter, θ. Chu and Cozzi
(2014) fixes l = 0.3 and choose the value of θ accordingly. In our case, we fix θ = 2.3 (in
line with Chu and Cozzi, 2014) while l adjusts freely. This approach enables the analysis
of employment. Table 1 reports the values for each parameter in the benchmark case,
mainly based on the United States (US) economy estimates.
6.1 Optimal markup
In this case, note that there is an extra relationship since the optimal trade union’s
markup, φ∗, depends on the R&D productivity parameter, ϕ, as follows:φ∗ = −{ΨΦ(1−θ)−Θ(
ϕ
ρ
+1)}±
√
{ΨΦ(1−θ)−Θ(ϕρ+1)}2−4(θΦ2)Ψ2
−2θΦ2
ϕ =
[
g
ln z
+ ρ
] [φ{µβ(1+i)+(1−β)i}+µ{(1−β)+θ(1+i)}]
(µ−φ)(1−β) − ρ
.
After some mathematical manipulation (see Appendix II), we find the optimal markup
associated with the existing R&D productivity parameter in the economy:
φ∗ =
 [ξ + Λµ+ Γχ]±
√
[ξ + Λµ+ Γχ]2 − 4Λµξ
2Λ
, 1
 . (41)
Table 2 and Table 3 report the simulation results under inelastic and elastic labour supply,
respectively. Regarding the first case, a competitive labour market framework works
better in all the considered scenarios, i.e., there seems to be no room for trade unions to
16
improve social welfare since the optimal markup is one (φ∗ = 1). However, under elastic
labour supply, this is certainly not the case since there is an exception that breaks the
optimality of the competitive labour market framework, which arises under the lowest
considered economic growth rate (f = 0.3) and β = 0.3. This implies that a trade union’s
markup greater than one, meaning a wage above the perfect competition scenario, might
actually be socially desired if the growth rate is below a particular level - in this case
below approximately 0.8%. The mechanism is the following: under a low growth rate and
a competitive labour market framework, there is an excess of R&D labour, lr, in terms of
social welfare, due to the low productivity of R&D sector (ϕ). Hence, by setting φ∗ > 1,
the trade union can increase social welfare through a reallocation of labour force due to
an increase in labour supply and wages. The latter effect has a negative impact on the
demand for R&D labour but a positive effect on the productivity of R&D, under a fixed
economic growth rate. Finally, the additional available labour supply through the former
effect will be employed in the final and intermediate sector .
Both tables also report the welfare gains from reducing the long-run nominal interest
rate from 8% to 0%.11,12 Interestingly, the welfare gains crucially depend on the value
of f and β, as well as on the elasticity of labour supply. The higher welfare gains are
achieved under elastic labour supply with the combination β = 0.6 and f = 1. On one
hand, a higher β implies a lower i∗. On the other hand, a higher f implies that monetary
policy can have a higher impact on the R&D policy and, ultimately, on economic growth.
Hence, the decrease in interest rate from 8% to 0% brings higher welfare gains within this
scenario.
f 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.35 0.3
g 2.00% 1.80% 1.60% 1.40% 1.20% 1.00% 0.80% 0.70% 0.60%
ϕ 3.20 2.91 2.62 2.33 2.04 1.75 1.46 1.32 1.17
φ∗ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∆U 1.94% 1.67% 1.39% 1.11% 0.84% 0.57% 0.29% 0.16% 0.02%
(a) β = 0.3
f 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.35 0.3
g 2.00% 1.80% 1.60% 1.40% 1.20% 1.00% 0.80% 0.70% 0.60%
ϕ 5.67 5.16 4.65 4.14 3.63 3.12 2.61 2.36 2.10
φ∗ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∆U 2.67% 2.37% 2.08% 1.78% 1.48% 1.18% 0.89% 0.74% 0.59%
(b) β = 0.6
Table 2: Optimal monetary policy - simulation under inelastic labour supply
11Note that, to calibrate the R&D productivity parameter, ϕ, we set the long-run interest rate to 8%.
12We report the welfare gains as the standard equivalent variation in consumption.
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f 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.35 0.3
g 2% 1.8% 1.6% 1.4% 1.2% 1% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6%
ϕ 10.77 9.81 8.84 7.88 6.91 5.95 4.98 4.50 4.15
φ∗ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01
4U 2.33% 2.02% 1.71% 1.40% 1.09% 0.78% 0.47% 0.32% 0.21%
(a) β = 0.3
f 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.35 0.3
g 2.00% 1.80% 1.60% 1.40% 1.20% 1.00% 0.80% 0.70% 0.60%
ϕ 18.91 17.22 15.53 13.84 12.15 10.46 8.77 7.93 7.08
i∗ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∆U 2.90% 2.58% 2.26% 1.94% 1.62% 1.31% 0.99% 0.83% 0.68%
(b) β = 0.6
Table 3: Optimal trade union’s markup - simulation under elastic labour supply
6.2 Optimal interest rate
Regarding the optimal interest rate, the Friedman rule is confirmed for all the con-
sidered scenarios, which implies that the results from Table 2 and Table 3 apply almost
fully, except for the case where φ∗ > 1.13 The optimality of the Friedman rule is in line
with Chu and Cozzi (2014) except for one case (g = 0.4), where the previous authors
found an optimal positive interest rate. The explanation relates with the specification of
the final-goods sector. In our paper, labour is considered as an input in the production
function, whereas in Chu and Cozzi (2014) labour can only be used in intermediate and
R&D sectors. Hence, since a higher β implies a lower i∗, and in Chu and Cozzi (2014)
β = 0 for any considered case, i∗ needs necessarily to be lower in our paper.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the welfare gains reported in the previous sub-
section where φ∗ > 1 (∆U = 0.21%) are higher than the welfare gains obtained for the
same circumstances but with φ∗ = 1 (∆U = 0.17%) .14 Note that, in terms of employ-
ment, lφ∗>1 > lφ=1, meaning that unions can actually rise the level of employment if
φ∗ > 1. These efficiency gains on R&D and on the employment level with markup greater
than 1 are in line with the empirical motivation introduced in Figure 1 (b,d), supporting,
therefore, our theoretical analysis.
6.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we provide a sensitivity analysis regarding three main parameters
{µ, z, i}. Taking into account the results of the previous section, where the Friedman
rule seems to be optimal across all cases, we focus our analysis only on the optimal trade
union’s markup. We first study the implications of changing the markup value (µ) under
three different scenarios: µ = 1.4 (Jones and Williams, 2000); µ = 1.6 (Abraham et al.,
2009; Banerjee and Russell, 2005; and Rotember and Woodford, 1991); and µ = 1.8
(Martins et al., 1996; and Rotember and Woodford, 1991). Furthermore, we decrease
the step size of a productivity improvement to z = 1.025 (Stokey, 1995), to take into
account less innovative countries. Finally, since the Friedman rule seems to correspond to
13In this case, ϕ = 4.02.
14Calculations available upon request.
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the optimal interest rate, we also consider the impact of decreasing the long-run nominal
interest rate to iLR = 0%. Table 4 and Table 5 report the simulation results.
Parameter Threshold φ∗max
µ
1.4 g = 0.80% 1.08
1.6 g = 1.40% 1.22
1.8 g = 1.80% 1.36
z 1.025 g = 0.80% 1.03
iLR 0 g = 0.80% 1.01
(a) β = 0.3
Parameter Threshold φ∗max
µ
1.4 − 1.00
1.6 − 1.00
1.8 g = 0.70% 1.07
z 1.025 − 1.00
iLR 0 − 1.00
(b) β = 0.6
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis (inelastic labour supply)
Parameter Threshold φ∗max
µ
1.4 g = 1.00% 1.10
1.6 g = 1.60% 1.24
1.8 g = 2.00% 1.37
z 1.025 g = 0.80% 1.04
iLR 0 g = 0.80% 1.02
(a) β = 0.3
Parameter Threshold φ∗max
µ
1.4 − 1.00
1.6 g = 0.70% 1.05
1.8 g = 1.00% 1.13
z 1.025 − 1.00
iLR 0 − 1.00
(b) β = 0.6
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis (elastic labour supply)
The threshold column corresponds to the growth rate below which the optimal trade
union’s markup is positive. The results can be summarised as follows. Firstly, under
β = 0.3, all the considered scenarios show a positive trade union’s markup for a specific
threshold level. Hence, countries with a lower labour share benefit from an active role
of trade unions in the form of higher markups. More specifically, under elastic labour
supply, µ = 1.8 implies a positive trade unions’ markup across all the considered growth
rates (g = [2%, 0.8%]). Hence, there might be cases where competitive labour markets
appear to be systematically inefficient since social welfare would increased with φ∗ > 1.
Intuitively, a higher markup in the intermediate sector allows the trade union to demand
a higher wage for its workers. In this case, unions work to decrease inequality between
monopolists and workers. Secondly, under β = 0.6, a higher µ leads to a φ∗ > 1, extending
therefore the results from the previous section, where competitive labour markets were
always efficient. Thus, countries with a higher labour share might also benefit from higher
trade union density, conditioned on higher µ. Furthermore, bringing iLR to 0 does not
have any impact on the φ∗ under β = 0.6, but implies φ∗ > 1 under β = 0.3. Note
that, as in the previous section, the welfare gains from reducing the nominal interest
rate from 8% to 0% are also higher with φ∗ > 1. Finally, lowering the step-size R&D
innovation has only an impact on φ∗ in the low labour share scenario. Our simulations
are supported empirically by Abraham et al. (2009) and Dobbelaere (2004), who report
unions bargaining power between [0.08, 0.18] and [0.244, 0.285], respectively.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we built a novel framework combining a Schumpeterian growth model
with CIA constraints and a labour union. We aimed to test the optimality of the compet-
itive labour market hypothesis, as well as of the Friedman rule. More specifically, our goal
was to understand whether trade unions could actually increase social welfare by demand-
ing a wage higher than the perfect competition equilibrium. Although nominal interest
rate and trade union’s markup can be considered as “distortions” within the standard
economic growth model, both implying lower economic growth rates, this might not be
the case in terms of welfare. Indeed, regarding the trade union’s markup, we found that
a competitive labour market framework might be suboptimal below a specific threshold
level of economic growth, depending on whether there is over or underinvestment of R&D.
Hence, trade unions can actually increase social welfare through a reallocation of labour
among sectors. Interestingly, this relationship seems to be stronger for countries with
lower labour share and higher rents in the intermediate sector. This latter case highlights
the redistributive effect of trade unions, contributing for a decrease in inequality between
monopolists and workers. Furthermore, there seems to exist an interdependency between
monetary policy and the macroeconomic role of trade unions: a lower (higher) interest
rate increases (decreases) the effectiveness of trade union’s markup on R&D labour and
social welfare. Therefore, these results have strong policy implications concerning mone-
tary policy and labour market frameworks. If the Friedman rule seems to be suitable for
a wide range of parameters (i.e., different type of countries), this is certainly not the case
for the labour market framework. Hence, for the case of the Eurozone, a “common” labour
market setting might be more “inefficient” than a common monetary policy. A correct
work of trade unions through determination of wages (i.e., the markup’s size) might be
the answer to promote economic growth and innovation.
Appendix I
Proof of Theorem 1: Define a transformed variable Ψt = ytvt . Its law of motion is given by
Ψ˚t
Ψt
=
y˚t
yt
− v˚t
vt
. (42)
Combining the resource constraint yt = ctNt with (16) and (14), the law of motion for
yt is
y˚t
yt
=
c˚t
ct
+ n = rt − ρ, (43)
because it = i for all t. From (10), the law of motion for vt is
v˚t
vt
= rt + λt − Πt
vt
. (44)
Notice that: λt = ϕlr,t and Πx = (µ−φ)µ Ly,t =
(µ−φ)
µ
(1− β) yt. Hence, substituting (43)
and (44) into (42), we obtain:
Ψ˚t
Ψt
=
(
(1− β) (µ− φ)
µ
)
Ψt − ρ− ϕlr,t. (45)
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In order to find a relationship between lr,t and Ψt, we first need to combine (9) with
(11) to obtain:
lx,t =
φ (1 + i) (1− β)
ϕµ
Ψt. (46)
The next step is to combine (9) and (15), yielding:
lt = 1− θ (1 + i)
φ (1− β)µlx,t (47)
Hence, combining (46),(47), (24) and lt = ly,t + lx,t + lr,t, we derive
lr,t = 1−
[
1 +
θ (1 + i) + φβ
φ (1− β) µ
]
(1 + i)φ (1− β)
ϕµ
Ψt (48)
Finally, substituting (48) into (45) we obtain an autonomous dynamic system of Ψt.
Ψ˚t
Ψt
=
{(
(1− β) (µ− φ) + (1 + i) [1 + µ [θ (1 + i) + φβ]]
µ
)}
Ψt − (ϕ+ ρ) . (49)
Thus, the dynamics of Ψt is characterised by saddle-point stability such that Ψt jumps
immediately to its interior steady-state given by
Ψt =
(ϕ+ ρ)
(1− β) (µ− φ) + (1 + i) {1 + µ [θ (1 + i) + φβ]} . (50)

Appendix II
Regarding the optimal trade union’s markup, (41), we have two equations:
[θµ (1 + i) (1− βφ) + (1− β) (µ− iφθ)] [µβ (1 + i)φ+ (1− β) (iφ+ µ) + θ (1 + i)µ] =
φ
{
(1− β)µ (1 + i) {θ + µβ + (1− β)}
(
ϕ
ρ
+ 1
)
ln (z)
}
g =
[
(µ− φ) (1− β) (ϕ+ ρ)
µβ (1 + i)φ+ (1− β) (iφ+ µ) + θ (1 + i)µ − ρ
]
ln z
Defining:
χ = (1− β)µ (1 + i) {θ + µβ + (1− β)} ln (z)
ψ = µ [θ (1 + i) + (1− β)]
ω = (1 + i)µβ + (1− β) i
We get the first equation as:
[ψ − ωθφ] [ωφ+ ψ] = χ
(
ϕ
ρ
+ 1
)
φ
ϕ =
[
[ψ − ωθφ] [ωφ+ ψ]
χφ
− 1
]
ρ
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Rearranging the second equation, we obtain:
ϕ =
[ g
ln z
+ ρ
] [φ {µβ (1 + i) + (1− β) i}+ µ {(1− β) + θ (1 + i)}]
(µ− φ) (1− β) − ρ (51)
Defining Γ =
[
g
ln z
+ ρ
]
, we can rewrite the previous equation as:
ϕ =
Γ [ωφ+ ψ]
(µ− φ) (1− β) − ρ (52)
Hence, combing 51 with 52, and after some mathematical manipulation, we got:
µρ (1− β)ψ − φ [ρ (1− β)ψ + (1− β)ωθρµ+ Γχ] + φ2 (1− β)ωθρ = 0
Finally, defining ξ = ρ (1− β)ψ and Λ = (1− β)Cθρ, we find the optimal markup as:
φ∗ =
[ξ + Λµ+ Γχ]±
√
[ξ + Λµ+ Γχ]2 − 4Λµξ
2Λ

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